Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Steven H. Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David M. McConkie, Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell; Attorneys for Respondents.
Billy L. Walker, M. David Eckersley; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, No. 880177 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/944

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U T A H C O U H T OP APPfcALS

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
DOCKET NO. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THfc STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

C^se No. 880177CA

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,

(pategory No. 7)

Defendants-Respondents,

RESPONDENTS* BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE H0MER WILKINSON

M. David Eckersley
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

David MJ McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lal^e City, Utah 84111

Billy L. Walker, Jr.
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

Attorneys for DefendantsResponqents

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

MLFD
JUN

9im

t Cier* of t*
Uilh Court o: *,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 880177CA

vs.

^Category No. 7)

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BR^EF

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON

M. David Eckersley
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Billy L. Walker, Jr.
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . .

4

ii
1

H

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. . . .

1

CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

10

POINT I:

DEFENDANTS* CONDUCT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
SUFFICIENT STATE ACTION TO INVOKE THE
ASSERTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS. . . . 11

POINT II: U.C.A. §78-30-4, AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE,
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION
PROVISION OF THE STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION

14

POINT III: U.C.A. §78-30-4(3), AS APPLIED IN THIS
CASE, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS
PROVISION OF THE STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION

27

POINT IV:

PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM CHALLENGING
78-30-4(3) UNDER ART. 1, §11 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
MAKE THE ARGUMENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT. . 35

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

36
,

37

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian,
657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983)

10

Baker v. Matheson,
607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979)

15

B. G. v. H. S. ,
509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. App. 1987)

34

Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982)

12

Brubaker v. Branine,
237 Kan. 488, 701 P.2d 1346 (1983)

10

Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979)

18, 19, 20, 23

Ellis v. Social Services Department,
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980)

23, 24, 27, 28, 31

Henig v. Odorioso,
385 F.2d 491 (3rd Cir. 1967)

12

Hulbert v. State,
607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980)

12

In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe,
717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986)
In the Matter of K.B.E.,
740 P. 2d 292 (Utah App. 1987)

13, 31, 35
31

In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy D,
742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1*985)

27, 34

In the Matter of Petition of Steve B.D.,
112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986)

13, 34

James v. Preston,
746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987)

35

Larsen v. Kirkham,
499 F. Supp. 960 (D. Utah 1980)

14

-ii-

Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983)

H

. . . 21, 22, 24, 33, 34

Madsen v. Brown,
701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985) . . . ^

16

Malan v. Lewis,
693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984)

15

Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978)

22

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830 (1982)

11, 12, 14

Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
681 P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1984). J .
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services,
680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984)

10
13, 14, 30, 31, 35

Slade v. Dennis,
594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979)

23

Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972)

33

State v. Earl,
716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)

11

State v. Fulton,
742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987)

11

Sumpter v. Harper,
683 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1982)
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services,
670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987)
Wells v. Children1s Aid Society,
681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984)

-iii-

12, 14
2, 14
24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 35

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
42 U.S.C. §1983
Utah Code Ann.
§55-8a-l
§78-2a-3(2)(g)
§78-30-4
§78-30-4(3)
§78-30-4(3)(c)
§78-30-12
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1
Utah Constitution, Article I
§ 7
§11
§24

8, 11
13
1
passim
1, 9, 16, 27
1, 10, 16, 35
1, 23
2
2, 12
1, 2, 35
2, 12

Other Authorities
Comment, "Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative
Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood
Perspective," 15 Seton Hall L.R. 290 (1985) . . . . 17
Goldstein, Beyond The Best Interests of The Child
(The Free Press, 1973)
29
Presser, "The Historical Background of the American Law
of Adoption," 11 J. Fam. L. 443 (1971)
14

-iv-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order of the district
court denying plaintiff's constitutional! challenge to the
adoptive placement of an illegitimate intffant lawfully
relinquished by the mother to LDS Social Services and placed
with adoptive parents on June 12, 1987. The Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction of this case pursuant td> Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(g).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendants1 conduct constituted sufficient

"state action" to invoke the asserted constitutional protections.
2.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that

U.C.A. §78-30-4, as applied in this case] does not violate the
equal protection provision of either the Utah or United States
Constitution.
3.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that

U.C.A. §78-30-4(3), as applied in this c^se, does not violate
the due process provision of either the tytah or United States
Constitution.
4.

Whether the plaintiff-appellaitt properly preserved

the claim that U.C.A. §78-30-4(3)(c) violates Article I, Section
11 of the Utah Constitution.
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES
Resolution of the issues presented! on appeal will be
determined by construction of the following authorities, which
are set out verbatim in the Addendum (Add}. 26-27):
1.

U.C.A. §§78-30-4 and 78-30-12;
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2.

Utah Constitution Art. I, §§7, 11, and 24;

3.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action by the putative father of an
illegitimate infant to prevent the infant's adoption by adoptive
parents with whom the infant was placed by LDS Social Services
following lawful relinquishment of the infant by the mother. (R.
2.)

The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a

preliminary injunction (R. 68, Add. 1-4) and subsequently
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 190, Add.
6-7).

Plaintiff appealed from the summary judgment. (R. 193.)

On appeal, a panel of this Court has previously denied
plaintiff's motions for summary reversal and injunction pending
appeal.

(Add. 24-25.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Brief does not accurately set forth the facts

of this case.

The Brief attempts to characterize plaintiff

variously as a "willing and responsible" (App. Br. 11), "fit and
willing" (App. Br. 12), "caring and involved" (App. Br. 13)
father.

However, the documented facts demonstrate otherwise.

This action was originally filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah; however, that court
dismissed the action under the abstention doctrine on the
grounds that it involves domestic relations matters over which
state courts have traditionally exercised exclusive control.
See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1545-46
(D. Utah 1987).
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Plaintiff is a 22-year-old singlei black man who, at all
times relevant to this action, has resided in an apartment in
Salt Lake County.

In late 1985 he began dating Penny Paxman, a

20-year-old single white woman who, at a^Ll times relevant to
this action, has resided at her parents' home in Salt Lake
County.

(Swayne Dep. from federal court action, included in

record of this case beginning at R. 109, pp. 3-9; Paxman Aff't,
R. 96, Add. 11; Amended Findings of Fact [ Conclusions of Law and
Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, hereinafter "Findings," R.
68, 1111 1-2, Add. 1-2; I Tr. 8, 30).

Throughout the time

plaintiff dated Penny, before and during the pregnancy, and even
after the baby's birth, plaintiff continued to date and engage
in sexual relations with other women.

Because of plaintiff's

unstable financial circumstances, Penny iften paid plaintiff's
rent and living expenses and loaned plaintiff her car for up to
four or five days a week.

(I Tr. 24-25, 138-39; Swayne Dep.

7-16, 22-25; Paxman Aff't H 5, Add. 12.)
When plaintiff learned in October of 1986 that Penny was
pregnant, he became angry and, until Marqh of 1987, denied that
the baby was his.
Swayne Dep. 26.)

(Paxman Aff't If 2, Add. 11; I Tr. 9, 27;
I
Plaintiff refused to m^rry Penny because, "It

didn't appeal to me."

(Swayne Dep. 31-32.)

In fact, at no time

"I Tr." refers to the transcript of the first part of
the preliminary injunction hearing, identified as R. 203, and
"II Tr." will refer to the separately bou|nd transcript of the
second part of the same hearing, identified as R. 204.
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prior to relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services did
plaintiff ever offer to marry Penny or to live with and support
her and the baby.

(Findings, HIT 3-4, Add. 2.)

Following the

relinquishment plaintiff proposed a secret, "paper" marriage to
enhance this court case, but they still would not have lived
together so Penny refused.

(I Tr. 25-28; Paxman Aff't IF 4, Add.

12. )
Penny discussed with plaintiff during the pregnancy the
possibility of placing the baby for adoption, explaining that
her parents favored adoption because of the baby's racial mix
and the couple's racial and religious incompatibility.

In fact,

Penny called and made an appointment with LDS Social Services in
March of 1987 to discuss adoption, but later decided to postpone
the appointment.

(Paxman Aff't H 3, Add. 11-12; Findings, H 5,

Add. 2; Swayne Dep. 33-34, 54-55; II Tr. 16-17.)

Plaintiff

suggested to Penny that if she kept the baby she and the baby
could live with plaintiff's mother in the mother's apartment.
However, plaintiff made it clear that Penny would be expected to
support herself and the baby and pay half of his mother's rent.
Thus, Penny would have ended up subsidizing the rent of both
plaintiff and his mother.

(I Tr. 28-30; Paxman Aff't If 4, Add.

12.)
Penny's baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on
June 4, 1987.

Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time

of the birth and visited Penny and the baby in the hospital.
(Paxman Aff't II 6, Add. 12.)

Hospital personnel explained to
-4-

Penny that in the case of an unmarried mbther the father's name
cannot be entered on the birth certificate unless the father
signs an Acknowledgment of Paternity for|n, supplied by the
hospital, signifying his "willingness and intent to support
[the] child to the best of [his] ability."
and Exhibits, R. 105, Add. 20-23.)

(See Brockert Aff't

Penny informed plaintiff of

the acknowledgment requirement and showed him the form that he
would have to sign to have his name placed on the birth
certificate, but he refused to sign it.

Consequently, the

baby's birth certificate shows no fatheri and the baby was given
Penny's surname.

Penny's mother checked her and the baby out of

the hospital on June 6, and Penny took the baby home to her
parents' house.

Plaintiff assumed no financial responsibility

for the hospital expenses or for the subsequent support of Penny
and the baby.

(Paxman Aff't If 6 and Exhibit, Add. 12-13, 15; I

Tr. 31-34; II Tr. 17-18, 38; Findings, Iff 6-8.)

3

Penny subsequently decided to meetf with LDS Social
Services regarding possible placement of the baby for adoption,
and an appointment was made for Monday, June 8, 1987 at 4:00
p.m.

Penny took the baby at the appointed time and, with her

parents, met and counseled with Elda C. Bowen regarding the
adoption process.

Mrs. Bowen inquired irjto the situation with

Plaintiff claims to have paid the "expenses associated
with his daughter's birth." (App. Br. 17| ) The truth is, he
paid none of the hospital or doctor billsj related to the birth,
At most, he paid one $45 doctor bill for lone of Penny's prenatal
check-ups. (II Tr. 5, 8.)
-5-

the baby's father, and Penny responded that he had no interest
in marriage or in living with and supporting her and the baby.
Mrs. Bowen discussed the available options with Penny, stressed
that Penny should do what she thought best for herself and the
baby, and even offered temporary foster care for the baby until
Penny made her decision.

Penny considered and weighed all the

circumstances, including plaintiff's lack of commitment to her
and the baby, her inability to support and rear the baby alone,
the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby into a possible
marriage with another man, future visitation rights, plaintiff's
continued involvement with other women, and the fact that
plaintiff had previously fathered a baby out of wedlock and
consented to its adoption.

In view of those considerations,

Penny concluded that adoption would be in the baby's best
interests.

(Paxman Aff'tfllf5, 7 Add. 12-13; Bowen Aff't 1I1I

1-5, R. 101, Add. 16-17; I Tr. 13-15, 31, 34-40; II Tr. 2-3;
Swayne Dep. 11-17.)
After Penny expressed her decision to relinquish the baby
for adoption, Mrs. Bowen telephoned the Bureau of Vital
Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and determined that
no claim of paternity had been registered for Penny's baby.
Mrs. Bowen then read and discussed with Penny the "Affidavit and
Release" form by which the relinquishment would be effected.
Penny stated that she understood the form and its legal
significance.

She then signed the form, transferring legal

custody and control of the baby to LDS Social Services.
-6-

Because

of the lateness of the hour, Mrs. Bowen permitted Penny to take
the baby home that night, and she returned the baby the next
day.

On June 12, 1987, LDS Social Servi ces transferred custody

and control of the baby to the adoptive parents, with whom the
baby has resided for the past year. (Paxban Aff't Ulf 8-9, Add.
13-14; Bowen Aff't 1W 6-8 and Exhibit, Add. 17-19; I Tr. 15, 41;
II Tr. 3-4; Findings 11 9, Add. 3.)
Plaintiff places great emphasis on events that occurred
after Penny relinquished legal custody ot the baby to LDS Social
Services.

While those events are immaterial, a response is

required to correct the record.

On Tuesday, June 9, before

returning the baby to LDS Social Service s that afternoon, Penny
took the baby to plaintiff's apartment si he could see the baby
one last time.

There is no mention in Appellant's Brief of the

fact that while Penny and the baby were there, one of
plaintiff's other girlfriends also dropped in for a visit.

And

contrary to plaintiff's claims, there is no evidence in the
record of any other visit of Penny and the baby to his
apartment.

(I Tr. 15, 42-43.)

Plaintiff" also claims that Penny

called him "each day" of her trip to California and deceived him
about having the baby with her.

(App. Br. 4.)

were on Wednesday and Saturday, June 10 and 13.

The only calls
More

importantly, the reason Penny delayed telling plaintiff that she
had relinquished the baby was that she fqared he would do
physical harm to her and her family.

(I Tr. 15-16, 44-49.)

After learning of the relinquishment!, plaintiff registered a
-7-

belated claim of paternity on June 15, 1987 and attempted to
amend the birth certificate to add his name.

However, plaintiff

has testified that if he were to obtain custody of the child, he
would give the child to his sister "to raise" until some
indefinite time when he might become "more stable."

(I Tr.

17-18; Swayne Dep. 28-30; Findings If 12, Add. 3.)
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging two "causes of action."
The first requests relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged
violation of federal constitutional rights under color of state
law, and the second seeks a declaratory judgment that U.C.A.
§78-30-4, facially and as applied, violates the equal protection
and due process provisions of the federal and state
constitutions.

(R. 2-5.)

The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction, concluding that success on the merits
was unlikely because, among other findings:
13. It was not impossible for plaintiff to have
filed his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date
the child was relinquished for adoption.
14. Throughout the pregnancy, plaintiff did not
behave in a manner consistent with that of a concerned,
committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent
or desire to assume the responsibilities of parenthood or
to keep and rear the child. [R. 70, Add. 3.]
The district court subsequently granted defendants summary
judgment, concluding that there was no "state action" to invoke
the claimed constitutional protections, and that section 78-30-4
is constitutionally valid on its face and as applied in this
case.

(R. 190-91, Add. 6-7.)
-8-

A panel of this Court denied plaintiff's motions for
summary reversal and injunction pending Appeal.

(Add. 24-25.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
«
Neither LDS Social Services nor the adoptive parents
engaged in "state action" by accepting the relinquishment and
adoptive placement of the illegitimate child.

Adoptive

placement of illegitimate children is historically a private,
nongovernmental function, and the fact that LDS Social Services
is licensed by the State or that it acted pursuant to State law
does not convert otherwise private action into state action.
U.C.A. §78-30-4 does not violate equal protection by
requiring the consent of the mother for ^option of illegitimate
children while conditioning the father's right of consent on the
timely registration of a claim of paternity.

Cases from both

the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
recognize that the mother's parental right is vested by virtue
of her role in bearing and caring for thq child, whereas the
father's right remains inchoate until he comes forward and
develops a substantial relationship with the child through
Plaintiff assumed no

assumption of paternal responsibilities,

responsibility for, and developed no relationship with, the
child.

Therefore, equal protection does not require that he be
i

accorded rights similar to those of the mother.
U.C.A. §78-30-4(3) was applied consistent with the
demands of due process because it adequately protected
plaintiff's opportunity to develop a relationship with his
-9-

illegitimate child.

Plaintiff's relationship with the child was

purely biological, and plaintiff failed to take the actions
within his control, i.e., marriage or timely registration of
paternity, to perfect his paternal rights and ensure a full
paternal relationship.

Plaintiff is presumed to know the law,

he knew of the time and place of birth, and it was not
"impossible" for plaintiff to register his paternity "through no
fault of his own."
Finally, plaintiff's assertion that section 78-30-4(3)(c)
violates the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution was
neither argued nor decided in the district court; therefore, the
argument may not be raised on appeal.
ARGUMENT
On appeal, plaintiff has abandoned his attack on the
facial validity of U.C.A. §78-30-4, now claiming only that it is
unconstitutional as applied.

Plaintiff also failed to challenge

or discuss the district court's threshold ruling that defendants
engaged in no state action sufficient to invoke the cited
constitutional protections.

(See App. Br. 1, 5.)

Since neither

issue was raised or briefed in the Appellant's Brief, both
issues must be deemed abandoned and neither may be reached by
this Court.

See, e.g., Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657

P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); Brubaker v. Branine, 237 Kan. 488,
701 P.2d 929, 931 (1985); Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 974, 976 (Colo. App. 1984).

With the

district court's state action ruling unchallenged and intact,
-10-

this Court need not reach the merits of the constitutional
claims.

See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).

Moreover, plaintiff's failure to brief the state constitutional
issues separately from the federal constitutional issues also
precludes consideration of the state law issues on this appeal.
See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 n.2 (Utah 1987); State
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986p.
Nevertheless, defendants here bri^f all the relevant
issues to demonstrate the correctness of the result reached by
the district court.
POINT I:

DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT
STATE ACTION TO INVOKE THE ASSERTED CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS.

It has been long settled that the due process and equal
protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to
"state action," not to acts of private persons or entities.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).

Likewise 42

U.S.C. §1983, which was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, applies only to deprivation of federal constitutional
rights "under color of state law."

id. at 838. The statutory

"under color of state law" requirement is) construed as
equivalent to the "state action" element of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Ld.

Thus, the sum test for r[elief under section

1983 is as follows:
The ultimate issue in determining wnether a person is
subject to suit under §1983 is the same question posed in
cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the
alleged infringement of federal rights "fairly
attributable to the State?" [Id.]
-11-

Private action may be attributed to the State only when the
State "has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
[action] must in law be deemed to be that of the State."

Id.

at 840.
For example, in Rendell-Baker the Supreme Court held that
a non-profit, private school's discharge of certain employees
did not constitute state action, even though the school received
public funds, was regulated by the State, and performed a
"public function."

Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991

(1982), the Court held that a private nursing home's decision to
transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care did not
constitute state action, despite "extensive regulation" and
indirect involvement by the State in the transfer decision.

See

also Sumpter v. Harper, 683 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1982)
(licensing of physicians does not create state action); Henig v.
Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491, 494 (3rd Cir. 1967) (conduct of private
orphanage was not state action).
Similarly, the due process and equal protection
provisions of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, §§7 and 24, are
intended to protect individual rights against infringement by
the government.

They have no application to the conduct of

private persons or entities.

As noted in Hulbert v. State, 607

P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980), "these provisions were designed to
protect the individual from state action."

-12-

LDS Social Services engaged in no "state action" in
accepting temporary custody of the baby from Penny and in
placing the baby with adoptive parents, ^nd the adoptive parents
did not engage in "state action" by accenting and maintaining
custody and care of the baby.

LDS Social Services is a private,

nonprofit welfare agency licensed by the State of Utah as a
qualified child placement agency pursuant to U.C.A. §55-Ba-l et
seg.

(Brown Aff't U 2, R. 94, Add. 9.) jHowever, that is the

extent of its contact with the State.

LIt>S Social Services

receives no government funding, and no governmental agency or
entity is involved in its internal operations, affairs, or
decisions.

More importantly, no governmental agency was

involved in the relinquishment, acceptance, or adoptive
placement of Penny Paxman's baby.

(Brown Aff't 1f1f 3-5, Add.

9-10.)
The Utah Supreme Court has previously indicated that LDS
Social Services' conduct under U.C.A. §78--30-4 "does not
constitute state action."

Sanchez v. L.D|, S. Social Services,

680 P.2d 753, 755 n.2 (Utah 1984).

See allso In re Adoption of

Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (due process does not limit tpe actions of private
parties involved in adoption process);

In the Matter of the

Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 7301 P.2d 942, 945-46
(1986) (mother's concealment of adoption not actionable under
14th Amendment).

That conclusion is undoubtedly correct since

the adoptive placement of children is notj and traditionally has
-13-

not been, "the exclusive prerogative of the State."
Rendell-Baker, supra, at 842; see Presser, "The Historical
Background of the American Law of Adoption," 11 J. Fam. L. 443
(1971).

As noted above, mere licensing by the State does not

convert otherwise private conduct into state action.
supra.

Sumpter,

Moreover, the fact that defendants acted under authority

of State law does not render their conduct state action.

See

Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D. Utah 1980).

4

In sum, the district court's judgment finding no state
action is correct, is not challenged on appeal, and may not be
disturbed on appeal.
POINT II:

U.C.A. §78-30-4, AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISION OF THE STATE
OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

The equal protection provisions of the state and federal
constitutions require only "that similarly situated people will

4
The federal district court in Swayne v. L.D.S. Social
Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987), found "state action"
for purposes of federal jurisdiction. However, that conclusion
was based on the erroneous assumptions that (1) section 78-30-4
effects a state-mandated "termination" of paternal rights,
rather than a self-caused forfeiture of those rights; and (2)
adoptive placement of children is the "exclusive and traditional
duty" of the State. id. at 1542-43. This Court is not bound to
follow the error of the federal court, but rather must follow
the lead of the Utah Supreme Court in Sanchez, supra. Even if
the federal Swayne decision were controlling, it would apply
only to the federal state action question and not to the state
action issue under the Utah Constitution.
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be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of different
circumstances will not be treated as if their circumstances were
the same."

Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 243 (Utah 1979).

Legislative classifications of a social pature are presumed to
be constitutional and must be upheld if "facts can reasonably be
conceived which would justify the distinctions or differences in
state policy as between different personb."

M . at 244.

Some

inequality in legislative line-drawing i||3 inevitable and
permissible:
[E]nactments [of a social or economic nature] require
legislative judgments which accord various weights to
various shadings of differences in human affairs.
Razor-thin distinctions which are entirely devoid of some
arbitrariness are rarely, if everj possible. The
rationality of the classification is a matter of degree.
If courts were to insist upon logical precision in
creating classifications not consistent with the nature
of the problem to be addressed, legislative power would
be seriously crippled. . . .
I
For the Legislature to devise effective means for
dealing with social and economic problems which affect
people and groups differently, it must frequently be able
to rely on approximations in deciding which groups fall
within and which are without the scope of legislation.
Id. at 243-44.
(Utah 1984).

See also Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 672 n.16
Thus, it is "of no particu]jar significance that

the [statute] in question discriminates[; ] . . . [t]he real
issue is whether the discriminations in tjhis case are
invidious."

Baker, supra, at 244.

Plaintiff argues that U.C.A. §78-3U-4 violates equal
protection by treating "similarly situated parents of an
illegitimate child in a different manner" and by treating unwed
fathers who fail to register their paternity differently from
-15-

other fathers.

(App. Br. 7.)

The latter argument comparing the

rights of unwed fathers to those of other fathers was not made
in the district court (R. 10, 48, 184), and may not be asserted
for the first time on appeal.
1088 (Utah 1985).

Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086,

Therefore, defendants here respond only to

the argument regarding the statute's different treatment of the
unwed mother and father.

As to the mother and father of

illegitimate children, section 78-30-4 creates no invidious
discrimination against the unwed father.
Section 78-30-4 governs the adoption of illegitimate
children in Utah.

(See Add. 27.)

Subsection (1) requires "the

consent of each living parent having rights in relation to [the]
child," unless the parent or parents have previously "released
his or her or their control or custody of such child" to a
licensed child placement agency.

Subsection (3)(a) provides

that "the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights
pertaining to his paternity of the child by registering with the
registrar of vital statistics in the department of health, a
notice of his claim of paternity . . . and of his willingness
and intent to support the child to the best of his ability."
The notice may be registered at any time prior to the birth, but
must be registered prior to the date the child is relinquished
to an adoption agency or, in the case of a private adoption,
before the filing of an adoption petition.

Subsection (3)(b).

If the father timely registers his claim of paternity, any
adoption of the child is vetoed and may not proceed without his
-16-

consent.

If the father fails to timely register his claim of

paternity, the mother may relinquish the child for adoption
without notice to or consent of the father, and the father is
thereafter barred from asserting his paternity.
(3)(c).

Subsection

Thus, the consent or release of the mother is required

unless her rights have been judicially terminated, while the
father's consent or release is required only if he timely
registers a claim of paternity, thereby giving him "rights in
relation to said child."
Plaintiff assails this disparate treatment of "two
similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child" (App. Br.
7); however, the falsity of plaintiff's premise requires
rejection of the entire equal protection argument.

The two

parents of an illegitimate child are not similarly situated, as
recognized from earliest times to the lat|est United States
Supreme Court decisions:
Although biologically the putative father of an
illegitimate child is a parent, at common law there was
no legally recognized relationship between a putative
father and his illegitimate child, The English common
law viewed an illegitimate child a |s filius nullius/ or
"the son of no one." . . .
This common law recognition of ajmother's exclusive,
primary right to the custody of her illegitimate child
arose from the presumption that the mother was a better
custodian than the putative fatherf The presumption was
based upon the ease with which the(mother could be
identified and located, the obligation normally placed by
society on the mother to care for and raise her children,
and the strength of the bonds of love and affection
assumed to exist between mother and child.
Comment, "Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers'
Rights:

A Psychological Parenthood Perspective," 15 Seton Hall
-17-

L.R. 290, 294-95 (1985).

This common law view of a putative

father's rights has been carried over into modern adoption
statutes and case law.

Ld. at 296-97.

However, it should be

noted that Utah's adoption statute accords rights to unwed
fathers far beyond those recognized at common law.

Under

section 78-30-4, the registration of paternity not only entitles
the father to notice of any adoption proceeding, but gives him
an absolute veto over an adoption.

By merely registering his

paternity, the unwed father acquires rights equal to those of a
married father.
Cabam v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), relied upon by
plaintiff, did not involve the adoption of an illegitimate
newborn.

Caban held that a statute permitting illegitimate

children to be adopted with the consent of the unwed mother
alone, without according the same right of consent to the unwed
father, violated equal protection as applied to the father of
older children with whom he had developed a substantial
relationship.

There, the parents lived together for five years

and held themselves out as husband and wife; the father was
listed on the children's birth certificates; he lived with the
children as their father for four years; he contributed to the
care and support of the family; and he visited and communicated
with the children even after separating from their mother.
at 382.

Id.

Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the

father's relationship with the children was just as substantial
as the mother's and that the purpose of the statute was
-18-

therefore not served by denying the father a voice in the
adoption,

id. at 393-94.

However, the Caban Court emphasized that the statute's
different treatment of unwed fathers and mothers would be
justified in the case of a newborn illegitimate child because
the father has not yet developed a substantial relationship with
the child.

At birth the mother's relationship with the child is

closer than the unwed father's, and legislative distinctions
based on that difference are acceptable.

See id. at 389. As

the Caban Court observed:
Even if the special difficulties ttendant upon locating
and identifying unwed fathers at irth would justify a
legislative distinction between m thers and fathers of
newborns, these difficulties need not persist past
infancy. . . . In those cases wh^re the father never has
come forward to participate in the rearing of his child,
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the
State from withholding from him tlje privilege of vetoing
the adoption of that child. [Id. at 392, emp. added.]
Other members of the Court in Cab^n echoed the view that
the unwed mother and father of illegitimate newborns are not
similarly situated with respect to the cl^ild:
With respect to a large group of adoptions--those of
newborn children and infants--unwed mothers and unwed
fathers are simply not similarly slituated . . . . Our
law has given the unwed mother the custody of her
illegitimate children precisely because it is she who
bears the child and because the vast majority of unwed
fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply
uninterested. This custodial preference has carried with
it a correlative power in the mother to place her child
for adoption or not to do so.
|
. . . These common and statutory! rules of law reflect
the physical reality that only the mother carries and
gives birth to the child, as well eis the undeniable
social reality that the unwed moth€ r is always an
identifiable parent and the custodian of the child--until
or unless the State intervenes. The biological father,
-19-

unless he has established a familial tie with the child
by marrying the mother, is often a total stranger from
the State's point of view. I do not understand the Court
to question these pragmatic differences. See ante, 392,
60 L Ed 2d, at 307. An unwed father who has not come
forward and who has established no relationship with the
child is plainly not in a situation similar to the
mother 1 s. [Id. at 398-99, Stewsurt, J., dissenting,
citations omitted, emp. added.] 5

Justice Stevens, joined by two other members of the
Court, observed:
Men and women are different, and the difference is
relevant to the question whether the mother may be given
the exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child
born out of wedlock. . . .
These differences continue at birth and immediately
thereafter. During that period, the mother and child are
together; the mother's identity is known with certainty.
The father, on the other hand, may or may not be present;
his identity may be unknown to the world and may even be
uncertain to the mother. These natural differences
between unmarried fathers and mothers make it probable
that the mother, and not the father or both parents, will
have custody of the newborn infant.
. . . [A]s a matter of equal protection analysis, it
is perfectly obvious that at the time and immediately
after a child is born out of wedlock, differences between
men and women justify some differential treatment of the
mother and father in the adoption process.
Most particularly, these differences justify a rule
that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive
right to consent to its adoption. Such a rule gives the
mother, in whose sole charge the infant is often placed
anyway, the maximum flexibility in deciding how best to
care for the child. It also gives the loving father an
incentive to marry the mother, and has no adverse impact
on the disinterested father. Finally, it facilitates the
interests of the adoptive parents, the child, and the
public at large by streamlining the often traumatic
adoption process and allowing the prompt, complete, and
reliable integration of the child into a satisfactory new
home at as young an age as is feasible. . . .
(continued)
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Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (11983), rejected the
equal protection argument raised by plaintiff in this case on
facts very similar to the present case.

There, the putative

father of an illegitimate child lived with the mother before the
baby's birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital at
the time of birth.

However, he did not place his name on the

baby's birth certificate, he did not live with the mother and
baby after the birth, he did not offer to marry the mother, and
he provided no financial support to the mother and baby.
at 252.

Id.

Two years later the mother and her husband filed an

adoption petition without notice to the father, and one month
later the father filed a paternity petition in a different
county.

The adoption order was entered pursuant to state law,

without notice to or consent of the fatheir, even though the
judge was aware of the father's paternity petition then pending
in a different court.

The father thereafter challenged the

constitutionality of the state law which (allowed adoption of
illegitimate children with the consent of] the mother alone,
without the consent of a father who had failed to register a
timely claim of paternity.

Id. at 251-53i.

(continued)
With this much the Court does n6t disagree; it
confines its holding to cases such as the one at hand
involving the adoption of an older child against the
wishes of a natural father who previously has
participated in the rearing of the child and who admits
paternity. Ante, at 392-393, 60 L Ed 2d, at 307-308.
[Id. at 404-08, Stevens, J., dissecting, footnotes and
citations omitted, emp. added.]
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The Lehr Court rejected the father's claim that the state
law violated equal protection by according greater rights to
unwed mothers of illegitimate children than to unwed fathers.
The Court emphasized that "the rights of the parents are a
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed."
257.

Id. at

The Court then adopted the view of the four dissenting

Justices in Caban "identify[ing] the clear distinction between a
mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of
parental responsibility."

Id. at 259-60.

The Court concluded

that because the father had never established a "substantial
relationship" with his illegitimate child, the statute did not
operate to deny equal protection:
Whereas [the mother] had a continuous custodial
responsibility for [the child], [the father] never
established any custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with her,. If one parent has an established
custodial relationship with the child and the other
parent has either abandoned or never established a
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prevent a State from according the two parents different
legal rights.
Id. at 267-68, emp. added.

See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434

U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (rejecting unwed father's equal protection
claim vis-a-vis married fathers because the unwed father had
"never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child").
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld section 78-30-4 on
similar grounds under the State and federal equal protection
provisions.

In Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d
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1250 (Utah 1980), the unwed father, who had developed no
relationship with his illegitimate child^ relied on Caban to
challenge the statute's unequal treatment of unwed mothers and
fathers.

The Court easily distinguished Caban on the fact that

the father there had developed a substantial relationship with
his children over a number of years.

Th^ Court noted that Utah

law protects such fathers by recognizing their adoption of
children by acknowledgment pursuant to section 78-30-12, without
registration of paternity.

(See Add. 27 )

However, the Ellis

Court concluded that where the unwed father has developed no
such relationship, equal protection does not require that he be
accorded an adoption veto power equal to the mother's.

615 P.2d

at 1255.6

Plaintiff criticizes Ellis as creating a "Catch 22"
for unwed fathers, and asserting that it [would be overruled if
the equal protection issue were re-examirjed. (App. Br. 16-18.)
Plaintiff misreads Ellis and section 78-30-12. That statute
does not protect unwed fathers who are merely "willing," or who
have merely "acknowledged" or admitted their paternity.
"Adoption by acknowledgment" involves much more, as illustrated
by Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979), where the unwed
father was present at the birth, paid thei expenses of birth,
placed his name on the birth certificate,! timely registered his
paternity pursuant to 78-30-4(3), and treated the child as his
own for the first two years of the child's life. Ellis did not
hold that registration of paternity is always required for
adoption by acknowledgment. See §78-30-12 ("The foregoing
provisions of this chapter do not apply to such an adoption.")
Rather, Ellis merely noted that failure tp register may result
in loss of the opportunity for adoption by acknowledgment.
Here, plaintiff assumed the risk that hisi illegitimate child
would be relinquished by the mother beforp adoption by
acknowledgement could be attained, and h€ lost.
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In Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah
1984), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its equal protection
holding in Ellis;
Implicit in that decision was the holding that there are
reasonable bases for the classifications in the statute
(between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers
who file and fathers who do not) and that these
classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a
proper government objective. [id. at 204.]
However, the Wells Court went beyond Ellis in identifying the
putative father's rights, the State's interest in the adoption
process, and the justification for according unwed mothers and
fathers different rights.
The Wells Court recognized that "an unwed father's right
to his relationship with his newborn is a provisional right by
comparison with the vested right of a parent who has fulfilled a
parental role over a considerable period of time."
emp. add.

M . at 206,

The Court explained that the father's right can be

forfeited pursuant to 78-30-4:
Although parental rights have their origin in
biological relationships, those relationships do not
guarantee the permanency of parental rights.
Constitutionally protected parental rights can be lost.
They can be surrendered pursuant to statute. [Ld. at
202". ]
Regarding the State's interest in the adoption of
illegitimate newborns, the Court stated:

See also Lehr v. Robertson, supra, at 265, where the
putative father's interest is referred to as "inchoate" until
perfected by marriage or registration of paternity.

-24-

There are special problems in defining parental rights
over newborns who are illegitimate. The identity of the
father may be unknown. The motheir may desire to give the
child up for adoption. The state has a strong interest
in speedily identifying those persons who will assume the
parental role over such children, I not just to assure
immediate and continued physical care but also to
facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to
its parents. The state must therefore have legal means
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether
the biological parents (or either of them) are going to
assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive
parents must be substituted. [ld\ at 203.]
The Court concluded that this "strong interest in immediate and
secure adoptions for eligible newborns provides a sufficient
justification for significant variations in the parental rights
of unwed fathers, who, in contrast to mothers, are not
automatically identified by virtue of their role in the process
of birth."

Id.

Plaintiff concedes that the Utah statutory scheme is
permissible with regard to unwed fathers ("whose identity and
location may be unknown," but argues that! it is unconstitutional
as applied to "identified, present and wi tiling fathers."
Br. 10.) This reasoning is superficial and faulty.

(App.

One of the

major problems encountered with illegitimate children is not
simply identifying the father, but ascertaining immediately
whether the father is committed to support the child and to
assume full legal responsibility for the lifetime care of the
child.

A father who is known and present but uncommitted is of

no more benefit to the child than a father whose identity and
location are unknown.

The State cannot merely assume that known

unwed fathers will exercise full parental responsibility for
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their illegitimate offspring.

Accordingly, the Legislature has

determined that the best way to ascertain conclusively which
unwed fathers intend to assume full parental responsibility for
their offspring is to require such fathers to inform the State
of that intent by registering their paternity before the
adoption process is commenced by relinquishment or petition.

If

the unwed father is allowed to wait until the adoption process
is commenced before communicating his interest to the State, the
crucial care and bonding between parent and child will be
delayed or interrupted and the State's interest, as identified
in Wells, will be defeated.
In this case, plaintiff's paternity and location were
known, but his legal commitment to the child was not.

For

several months he denied the baby was his; he did not sign the
birth certificate; he did not pay the hospital expenses; he
failed to timely register his paternity; he never offered to
marry Penny; and he had no intention of living with and
supporting Penny and the baby.

To the contrary, he continued

dating and engaging in sexual relations with other girls during
the pregnancy and after the birth.

He merely assumed that Penny

would keep the baby for his convenience.

Thus, if plaintiff was

a "willing and responsible" father, no one else knew it.

Even

now, plaintiff wants the baby only for his sister to raise.
Only after the adoptive parents stepped in to assume plaintiff's
responsibility, after the bonding between baby and parents had
begun, did plaintiff step in to belatedly assert his "rights."
-26-

Under Utah law as construed by this State's highest court,
plaintiff is too late and may not now se^er the bonds of the
adoptive family.

See also In the Matter!of the Adoption of Baby

Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1068-69 (Okla. 198$) (same result on
o

similar statute).
In sum, U.C.A. §78-30-4, as applied in this case, did not
result in unconstitutional discrimination against the plaintiff.
POINT III;
U.C.A. §78-30-4(3), AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS PROVISION OF THE STATE
OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
The essence of plaintiff's due prdcess argument is that
section 78-30-4(3) denied him a hearing in which to prove his
paternal interest in the child and thereby failed to protect his
"opportunity" to develop a relationship with the child
Plaintiff does not claim a right to notiq|e of such a hearing,
(App. Br. 21, 24-26, 28.)

This argument amounts to nothing more

than a facial attack on the procedural fejatures of the statute
itself, and has been squarely rejected by the Utah Supreme Court
In Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 1250
(Utah 1980), the unwed father asserted the same argument as that
raised in the present case, challenging "the constitutionality
of the presumption that a father has abandoned his illegitimate
Q

Plaintiff also claims that Penny was no more concerned
for the baby than he was, as evidenced by her relinquishment.
(App. Br. 9-13.) However, it was Penny who had custody of the
baby and who provided care and support for the baby. Her
relinquishment of the baby for adoption cannot be construed as
"indifference" or "unfitness," but is the highest manifestation
of her love and concern for the child's b$st interests and
lifetime care.
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child where he does not file a timely notice of paternity with
the Bureau."

M . at 1255.

The Court characterized the argument

as claiming denial of procedural due process.

_Id. The Court

upheld the procedural validity of 78-30-4(3), but noted that it
may violate due process as applied if "it [was] impossible for
the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the
statutory bar, through no fault of his own."

Jd. at 1256.

Since the mother there came to Utah from out-of-state and gave
birth to the child without the father's knowledge, the Court
remanded for a determination of whether the father reasonably
could have known of the time and place of the birth, and could
thus have protected his rights through a timely registration of
paternity.

Id.

In two subsequent decisions the Court reaffirmed the
facial validity of 78-30-4(3) and applied the Ellis
"impossibility" standard to uphold the statute as applied.

In

Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the
unwed mother traveled to a distant city within the state to
deliver the baby and relinquish it for adoption.

Throughout the

pregnancy the father had been "equivocal, never indicating
positively whether or not he desired to assert his paternal
rights."

Id. at 202. While the father knew of the possibility

of adoption, he did not mail his claim of paternity until the
day of the birth, and consequently it was not received by State
officials until one day after the relinquishment.

The Court

held that the registration was too late and that the statutory
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termination of the father's rights was vfclid under the State and
federal due process provisions.
In upholding the facial validity 6f the statute, the
Wells Court expressly held that an unwed father's right to a
relationship with his illegitimate child "can be surrendered
pursuant to statute," without a showing 0f unfitness or
abandonment.

Id. at 202.

The Court recognized the State's

"compelling interest in speedily identifying those persons who
will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate
children."

Jd. at 206.

The Court observed:

Speedy identification is important to immediate and
continued physical care and it is essential to early and
uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. If
infants are to be spared the injury and pain of being
torn from parents with whom they have begun the process
of bonding and if prospective parents are to rely on the
process in making themselves available for adoptions,
such determinations must also be fjinal and irrevocable.
[Id. at 206-07.] 10
The Court held that 78-30-4(3) "is narrowly tailored to achieve
the purposes identified above."

Id. at 207. The Court

concluded that "[d]ue process does not require that the father

That disposes of plaintiff's repeated argument that he
is entitled to a "judicial finding of parental unfitness or
abandonment." (App. Br. 23.) The cases ited by plaintiff for
that point are all distinguishable on the ground that they deal
with fully vested parental rights, while plaintiff's rights
remained "provisional" or inchoate until tjhey were "surrendered"
pursuant to 78-30-4(3). See Wells, supra, at 206.
For an enlightening discussion of an adopted child's
bonding process and the serious detrimental impact that
disruption of the process causes the child and its adoptive
family, see Goldstein, Beyond The Best Interests of The Child
pp. 32-37 (The Free Press, 1973).
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of an illegitimate child be identified and personally notified
before his parental right can be terminated."

Id.

The Wells Court also upheld the statute as applied,
noting that the birth occurred in the same state as the father's
residence, the father knew of the time of birth and the
possibility of adoption, and he failed adequately to communicate
an intent to assert his parental rights.

Accordingly, it was

not "impossible" for the father to timely register his paternity
"through no fault of his own.."

id. at 207-08.

In Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah
1984), the Court upheld application of 78-30-4(3) on facts much
more favorable to the father than those in the present case.
There, the couple lived together, the unwed father knew of the
pregnancy, he knew the time and place of birth, he visited the
mother and baby in the hospital, he proposed marriage, and he
also expressed his desire for the mother and baby to live with
him.

The mother discussed possible adoption with the father,

and he attempted to sign the birth certificate and register his
paternity, but was prohibited from registering until after the
baby had been relinquished.

The Court concluded that since the

father knew of the time and place of birth "and was presumed to
know the law," his late registration was ineffective.
755.

Id. at

The Court reasoned:
It is of no constitutional importance that Sanchez came
close to complying with the statute. Because of the
nature of subject matter dealt with by the statute, a
firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential.
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. . . [T]he degree of the father's diligence and
sincerity in trying to establish his parental rights
. [is] foreign to the statutory provisions. [Id.]
Most recently, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe,
P.2d 686 (Utah 1986),

717

the Court held that application of the

statute violated due process, but on facts distinguishable from
those of the present case.

There, the unwed parents lived

together for over three years, the mother moved to Utah from
out-of-state to have the baby, the mother told the father that
she and the baby would live with him, the couple planned to
marry, and the father was in Arizona locating a home for the
family when the baby was born prematurely)

id. at 687.

On

those facts the Court held that the fathe b could not reasonably
have complied with the registration requirement and that his
late registration should be honored.

Ld. at 691.

However, the

Court reaffirmed that due process does nor require actual notice
of termination of an unwed father's rights "where the father
knows or should know of the birth and can reasonably take the
timely action required to avoid the statutory bar." Id. 11
The facts of the present case align much more easily with
Wells and Sanchez than with Ellis and Baby Boy Doe.

11

This Court's decision in In the Matter of K.B.E., 740
P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987), adds nothing toj the law as set forth
in the foregoing decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.
That
case holds simply that where the mother doles not intend to
relinquish the baby for adoption, but races to the court with a
petition merely to cut off the father's rights, the father's
acknowledgment filed within hours after the birth is valid.
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Plaintiff learned of the pregnancy in October of 1986 and had
from then until the relinquishment on June 8, 1987 to register
his claim of paternity.

Unlike the fathers in Ellis and Baby

Boy Doe, plaintiff was a Utah resident, was presumed to know
Utah law, and had full knowledge of the time and place of
birth.

Like the father in Wells, plaintiff was "equivocal"

about asserting his paternal rights.

See 681 P.2d at 202.

He

knew of the possibility of adoption, yet he refused to sign the
birth certificate, he paid none of the hospital expenses, there
were no plans to marry or live together, there was no offer of
support, and he continued dating other girls as before.

As

Penny testified, it was plaintiff's demonstrated lack of
commitment to her and the baby that caused her to relinquish the
baby for adoption.

(I Tr. 38.)

Like the father in Sanchez,

plaintiff saw the mother and baby after the birth and "assumed"
Penny would keep the baby, see 680 P.2d at 755, but he developed
no relationship with the baby and demonstrated no interest in
asserting his paternal rights until after the baby was
relinquished. 12

Thus, plaintiff's statutory forfeiture of his

paternal rights does not offend due process.

Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he saw the baby
"daily" prior to relinquishment and that his family also visited
the baby. (App. Br. 22.) Those assertions are unsupported in
the record. Between Saturday June 6 when Penny left the
hospital and Tuesday June 9 when Penny physically delivered the
baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff saw the baby only once,
and that was after the relinquishment, at plaintiff's apartment,
while one of his other girlfriends was present. (See Statement
of Facts, infra, p. 7.)
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That conclusion is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's due process holding in Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983).

(The facts of Lehr wer< outlined above in

connection with its equal protection analysis.)

The father

there raised the same argument as plainti)ff does here, that a
statute requiring timely registration of an unwed father's
paternity does not adequately protect the father's right to
demonstrate or develop a relationship with his child.
distinguished Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.

The Court

645 (1972), relied
•

upon by plaintiff here, on the basis that it involved
termination of a fully "developed parent-child relationship,"
whereas the father in Lehr had no such relationship.
at 261.

463 U.S.

The Court explained:

When an unwed father demonstrates A full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward
to participate in the rearing of his child," his interest
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause. . . . But the
mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection. [JUi.]
The "biological connection," noted the Court, offers the father
"an opportunity" to develop a relationship with the child, but
if he fails to do so, due process does not require his input or
consent regarding the child's adoption.

la. at 262. The Court

concluded that the father's "opportunity interest" was
adequately protected by the State's marriage law and putative
father registration statute, under which "-phe right to receive
notice [of an impending adoption] was comp etely within [the
father's] control,

The possibility that he may have
-33-

failed to [register his claim of paternity] because of his
ignorance of the law cannot be sufficient reason for criticizing
the law itself."

Ld. at 263-64.

13

The Court added that

"legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of
young children and having the adoption proceeding completed
expeditiously . . . justify a trial judge's determination to
require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the
procedural requirements of the statute."

Id. at 265.

14

Thus, 78-30-4(3) was applied to plaintiff consistent with
the due process provisions of the State and federal
constitutions.

13
The Court accepted the Legislature's judgment that "a
more open-ended notice requirement would merely complicate the
adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed
mothers, create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair
the desired finality of adoption decrees." Ld. at 264.
14
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Lehr on the basis
that "it deals with a wholly different statute." (App. Br.
30.) However, U.C.A. § 78-30-4(3) is more favorable to unwed
fathers than the statute upheld in Lehr because the Utah law
gives registered fathers an absolute veto power over any
adoption, whereas the New York law allowed registered fathers
merely to present evidence "relevant to the best interests of
the child." See Lehr, supra, at 251 n.5.
Other state courts have upheld similar statutes under due
process challenges. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Adoption of
Baby Boy I)# 742 P.2d 1059, 1065-68 (Okla. 1985); B.G. v. H.S. ,
509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. App. 1987); In the Matter of the Petition
of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986).
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POINT IV:

PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM CHALLENGING 78-30-4(3)
UNDER ART. I, §11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE
HE FAILED TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT.

Plaintiff argues that U.C.A. §78-30-4(3)(c) violates the
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, §11,
because it purports to bar an unregistered father "from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his
paternity of the child."

(App. Br. 32.)

While plaintiff

mentioned "Art. I, §11" in his Complaint, U 14 (R.5), he alleged
violations of only equal protection and diie process.

Moreover,

plaintiff failed to make the open courts argument to the
district court (R.10, 48, 1 8 4 ) , and the court's Judgment
contains no ruling on the issue (R. 190, Add. 6 ) .

Consequently,

plaintiff did not properly preserve the argument for assertion
on appeal.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App.

1987).
Even if the open courts argument hkd been preserved for
appeal, it has no merit.

Plaintiff obvioussly has not been

denied access to the courts, as evidenced by the past year of
litigation in the federal and state judicijial systems.

Moreover,

the case of Baby Boy Doe illustrates that an unwed father's
access to the state courts is meaningful ahd may result in the
remedy demanded.

Even where the unwed fatjher is unsuccessful in

the litigation, as in Wells and Sanchez, the bar provision of
78-30-4(3)(c) has never been cited as the basis for the
decision.

Neither may the bar provision fairly be classified as

a statute of repose.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the
Judgment of the district court.
DATED this ^*-day of June, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

By: -&£»&.

4SZ &{&.

David M. McConkie
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and
correct copies of the Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid, this
^*-day of June, 1988, to the following:

M. David Eckersley
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Billy L. Walker, Jr.
120' North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

&*!-£
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DEC 3 USB?
David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

OepotvCte*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

fiMEi/DED

STEVEN H. SWAYNE,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER DENYING
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.
This matter came on for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and was heard before the Honorable Judge
Homer Wilkinson at a special hearing on Novtember 13, 1987.
Plaintiff was represented by Billy L. Walker and M. David
Eckersley, and defendants were represented by David M. McConkie
and Merrill F. Nelson.

Following the hearing, the Court took

the matter under advisement.

Based on the testimony and

exhibits presented at the hearing and the memoranda submitted by
the parties, the Court hereby enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Penny Paxman is the natural mother of a child born

out of wedlock in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 4, 1987.
Plaintiff is the unwed father of the baby.
2.

Both plaintiff and the mother resided in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, throughout the pregnancy and during all
times relevant to this matter.
3.

Plaintiff first learned of the pregnancy in October

of 1986.
4.

Plaintiff and the mother have never been married and

did not live with each other during the pregnancy.

Prior to the

relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff
never offered to marry the mother, to live with the mother, or
to financially support the mother or the baby.
5.

Plaintiff and the mother discussed during the

pregnancy that the mother's parents wanted her to relinquish the
baby for adoption.
6.

Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time of

the birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital
following the birth.
7.

Plaintiff was informed of the need to sign an

acknowledgment of paternity form in the hospital in order to
have his name entered on the baby's birth certificate as its
father.

The form was provided and made available to plaintiff

in the hospital but he did not sign it.
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The baby's birth

certificate shows no father and the baby was given the mother's
surname.
8.

Prior to the relinquishment, plaintiff had assumed

none of the financial responsibility for %he hospital expenses
or the baby's support.
9.

On June 8, 1987 the mother signed an Affidavit and

Release relinquishing care and custody of the baby to defendant
LDS Social Services to place the baby for adoption.

LDS Social

Services subsequently placed the baby with adoptive parents,
with whom the baby has since resided.
10. The mother did not notify plaintiff before
relinquishing the baby for adoption.
11.

On June 13, 1987 the mother informed plaintiff that

she had relinquished the baby for adoption.
12.

On June 15, 1987 the plaintiff registered his

acknowledgment of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics
and applied for an amendment to the birth certificate to
designate himself as father of the child.
13.

It was not impossible for plaintiff to have filed

his notice of claim of paternity prior to tjhe date the child was
relinquished for adoption.
14.

Throughout the pregnancy, plainrciff did not behave
I

in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, committed
father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent or desire to
assume the responsibilities of parenthood or to keep and rear
the child.
-3-

15.

Plaintiff testified that if he were awarded custody

of the child he would relinquish it to his sister to care for.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In view of controlling case law, it is unlikely that

plaintiff will prevail on his claims that Utah Code Annotated
§78-30-4(3) violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions, either on its
face or as applied.
2.

3t does not appear from the evidence that plaintiff

would suffer irreparable injury by leaving the baby in adoptive
custody pending resolution of the merits of the lawsuit.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and the Court having fully considered the evidence and
arguments presented, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied.
DATED this sf ' day of December, 1987.
BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order Denying Preliminary Injunction postage prepaid, this
day of December, 1987, to:
Billy L. Walker, Jr.
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
M. David Eckersley
Houpt, Eckersley & Downes
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No, 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson on March 4, 1988.
Plaintiff was represented by M. David Eckersley;

Defendants

were represented by David M. McConkie and Merrill F. Nelson.
The Court, having reviewed and considered the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, memoranda and exhibits submitted by the
parties, as well as the testimony and findings from the prior
hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, hereby
enters final judgment as follows:
1.

The record contains no genuine issue as to any

material fact.

2.

The challenged acts of defendants do not constitute

state action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or unper the due process and
equal protection provisions of either the United States
Constitution or the Utah Constitution.
3.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 is valid, on its face and as

applied to the facts of this case, under both the due process
and equal protection provisions of both the United States and
Utah Constitutions.
4.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby

granted, and plaintiff's action is dismissed.
5.

Defendants are awarded their costs pursuant to

U.R.Civ.P. 54(d).
DATED this / / day of March, 1988f

Hon. Horner Wilkinson
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Approved as to Form:
QeZVi*

&**

M. Dftvid Eckersle^/?
C

o
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, this
of March, 1988, to:

M. David Eckersley
Houpt, Eckersley & Downes
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Billy L. Walker, Jr.
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Plaintiff

sfr* 'U
^
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day

David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FpR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

vs.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF
HAR0LD BROWN

Civil No. C-87-05969
Jud^re Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

:
)
: SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Harold Brown, being first duly s^orn, depose and state
as follows:
1.

I am the Director of LDS Social Services.

2.

LDS Social Services is a private, nonprofit welfare

agency licensed by the State of Utah as a qualified child
placement agency pursuant to U.C.A. §55-8a-l et sea.
3.

No governmental agency or entity is involved in the

internal operations, affairs, or decisions of LDS Social

Services, except as expressly authorized by the licensing
statute.
4.

LDS Social Services receives no government funding.

5.

No governmental agency or entity was involved in

Penny Paxman's relinquishment and LDS Social Services1
acceptance of the custody and control of her baby on June 8,
1987, or in the decision to transfer custody and control of the
baby from LDS Social Services to the adoptive parents.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

Harold Brown

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2£&Pday
February, 1988.
My Commission Expires:
fc ~£R -£T

of

NOTARY" PUBLIC /
*
Residing in: \JAjy-^>iJpj

/o~7
fc/&

(sjxJ__
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAHI
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
AFFIDAVIT OF
FENNI JEAN PAXMAN

Plaintiff,
vs.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,

CiVil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

Penni Jean Paxman deposes and states that:
1.

r

At all times relevant to this action I have resided

with my parents in their home in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

I began dating Steven Swayne in late 1985 and

learned in October of 1986 that I had become pregnant by him.
When I informed Steven that I was pregnant, he became angry and
at first denied that the baby was his. ~M-^r _/rf&re>A-

a/Jo

oO-szu~Lec£
3.

ZI/T-LJ

£>u-X>y<-J~mc

/</B7 /u<J>

AyjL-^L/j

In approximately March of 1987,| Steven and I

dracussed the fact that my parents wanted me to place the baby

11

for adoption.

I called LDS Social Services during that same

month to make an appointment to discuss placing the baby for
adoption, but later decided to postpone the appointment.
4.

Steven never offered to marry me or to live with and

support me and the baby.

He suggested that, if I did keep the

baby, I could live with his mother in her apartment.

It was

understood that I would be expected to support myself and pay
half the rent.
5.

During the time I was dating Steven, I often gave

him money to pay his apartment rent and other expenses.

I knew

that during the time we were dating, both before and during my
pregnancy, Steven was also dating and having sexual relations
with other girls.

I also knew that he had previously fathered a

baby out of wedlock and that the baby had been placed for
adoption.
6.

Ny baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on

June 4, 1987.
hospital.

Steven knew of the birth and visited me in the

During one of Steven1s visits to the hospital, I

informed him that in order to have his name entered on the
baby's birth certificate as the father he would have to sign a
paternity form.

I showed the form to Steven but he did not

sign it, and his name was not entered on the birth certificate.
(See attached exhibit.)

On June 6, 1987, my baby and I were

discharged from the hospital and I took the baby home to my

12
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parents' house.

Steven has paid none of the hospital expenses

or expenses to support me and the baby.
7.

On June 8, 1987, I took the baby to LDS Social

Services to receive counseling regarding placing my baby for
adoption.

My parents went with me.

The counselor at LDS Social

Services, Elda Bowen, explained to me the adoption process.
When Mrs. Bowen asked about the baby's father, I explained to
her that Steven had no interest in marriage or in living with
and supporting me and the baby.

Both Mrsl Bowen and my parents

told me that the decision to place the baby for adoption was
mine alone to make.

Mrs. Bowen told me that if I was not sure

about placing the baby for adoption, I ^ould place the baby in
temporary foster care until I made my decision.

After

considering all of the circumstances, such as Steven's lack of
interest in me and the baby, my inability to support and rear
the baby alone, the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby
into a possible marriage with another man, and the needs of the
baby to have a good home, I decided that it would be best for
the baby to place her for adoption.
8.

Mrs. Bowen reviewed with me th^ release form and

asked me if I understood what I was doing.

I told her that I

understood the form and its effect and thati I wanted to do what
was best for the baby.

I then signed the form releasing the

care and custody of my baby to LDS Social Services.
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9.

I asked Mrs. Bowen if I could take the baby home

that night and bring her in the next day.

Mrs. Bowen agreed,

and I returned the baby to LDS Social Services the next day.
DATED this ^

day of February, 1988.

\ ^ > &^y(^jfe^sn

a^<^/

Penni Jean Paxman

SUBSCRIBED AND*?W5RN to before me this <C?^ day of
February, 1988.
My Commission Expires:
&l(^A>y;p^ /ffo

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in: jtf*uM£/l/

J6ZA
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

v.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF
ELDA C. BOWEN

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: BS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Elda C. Bowen deposes and states that:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah.

2.

I am an employee of LDS Social Services, a child

placement agency licensed to receive children for placement or
adoption pursuant to Title 55, Chapter 8a, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
3.

I am employed by LDS Social Services as a social

worker specializing in counseling with unwed mothers.

I have

been employed in this position by LDS Social Services for the
past sixteen years.

4.

Penny Jean Paxman called the Sandy office of LDS

Social Services on March 10, 1987 and made an appointment to
meet with me the next day to discuss possible adoptive placement of the baby she was expecting.

Penny subsequently called

and cancelled the appointment.
5.

Following the birth of Penny's baby, an appoint-

ment was made for me to meet with Penny on June 8, 1987. On
that day, Penny brought the baby with her tJo my office to
discuss placing the baby for adoption.
also present at that meeting.

Penny's parents were

I inquired apout the baby's

father, and Penny told me that he had indicated no interest in
forming a family unit, in supporting the baby, or in planning
for the baby's future.

I explained the adoption process,
i

stressed to Penny that whether to relinquish the baby was her
decision alone, and informed her that she could place the baby
in temporary foster care until she made her decision.

Penny

decided at that meeting that adoption would be best for the
baby.
6.

During that same meeting, I telephoned the Bu-

reau of Vital Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and
inquired whether an Acknowledgement of Paternity had been
filed for Penny's baby.

I was informed that an Acknowledge-

ment had not been filed.
7.

I then showed a relinquishment form to Penny

entitled "AFFIDAVIT AND RELEASE".
to.)

(Exhibit ^, attached here-

I filled in the preliminary information and read aloud

the entire form from beginning to end as Penny followed
along.

I asked her if she understood the form and the effect

of signing it and was doing so by her own free will and
choice.

She responded affirmatively to those questions and

then signed the form.

After signing, Penny expressed her

relief and her belief that it was the right decision.
8.

Penny asked if she could take the baby home

overnight and return her the next day.

I consented, and Penny

returned the baby to me at my office at 5:00 p.m. on June 9,
1987.

LDS Social Services transferred custody of the baby to

her adoptive parents on June 12, 1987.
DATED this <$A_ day of February, 1988.

Elda C. Bowen

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
February, 1988.

day of

/Residing at
My Commission Expires:
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v
AF • )AVIT
Ar!0 RELEASE

k

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
6 A T H © * * fl
I, y~?/issi*e-<:/K-/f&'i^'
/ ^ a V ^ T ^ a / ^ / b e i n g firstjdulysworn on oath, depose and s.
T Thaf J am the parent of a minor child, namely /6n A>±S G"-/
/^jtrrTQ^'
born on the
>/zx^.^/?
day of
t ////iyA
. IS B7; at**
^T.JL.CL
County of , ^ z /
State of
/ , T / > ^> .1
2. That because I feel the c h i l d ' s best I n t e r e s t s will be served, I hereby rele2S
said child to the care, custody and control of the LOS Social Services,'for placement fo
adoption pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated § 55-8a-l fit s e c . (1953).
3. That I fully understand and am aware of the fact t h a t by my action, I am relea:
and do hereby so r e l e a s e , my parental rights with regard to said c h i l d , and in fact, autr
the LOS Social Services to exercise i t s discretion in the placement of said child.
4. That, further, I do hereby consent t o the legal adoption of said child by those
persons whom the said LOS Social Services may, in t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n , designate and approve
be adopting parents who are able to furnish said child with a proper name, home and care.
5. That I fully understand and consent that the said LOS Social Services may, in it
d i s c r e t i o n , release the care, custody, and control over s^id minor child to another licens
child placement agency for adoption and placement within said other agency's discretion,
i f t h i s i s deemed necessary to serve the best i n t e r e s t s of t h e child.
6. That I hereby waive notice of any and a l l legal proceedings which may be held in
Courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of determination or release
»nd the adoption of said child or any thereof.
7. That I have read the foregoing statement and I fjully understand the impact of
he terms and conditions to which I do agree, and consent; and that my action herein taken
s of my own free will, executed voluntarily without any coercion, force, or duress, and
ithout any promises of any kind whatsoever, except that tlpe best interests of said child
ill be the paramount, controlling factor'fh its placement]

tness

//~l
)

tnoct

f

tness
VTE OF UTAH

Signature of Parent

)

INTY OF SALT LAKE )
OIL the «&&£ day of
0/^J>S
* 19 t/
, personally appeared before
&&>**t*? 0/s^S 6 ^ ^ < L 4 ^
, the signer j>f the foregoing instrument, who
^iecgecytayfie tnat sne/fie ex
ncmtzzezAO'rte
executed tne same.
otory Public
onmissicn expires:
»
~ ~

?

Aodress

**
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN H. SWAYNE,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

vs.

:

L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES,
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN E. BROCKERT

Civil No. C-87-05969
Judge Homer Wilkinson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
John E. Brockert, being first duly sworn deposes and says
as follows:
1.

I am a director of the Bureau of Vital Records for

the State of Utah.
2.

The revised Utah vital statistics rules which became

effective March 17, 1987, specify in Rule 405-3-4 (attached
hereto as Exhibit "A") that a child born to an unmarried mother
may not have the father's name entered on a birth certificate
unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgment of paternity
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B").

3.

Rule 3.4 has been in effect since March 17, 1987 and

has been a requirement since 1972 for all births occurring in
the State of Utah.
DATED this

day of February, 1$88.

giLLh
John E. Iprockert, Director of
Vital Records

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me ^his ;Ay
February, 1988.
My Tonupission Expires:
FARY PUi
Residing

day of

IS^/Us/U
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This amendment shall be processed In the manner prescribed 1n Section 3.2 of
these rules.
Rule 3.4

Acknowledgement of Paternity by Natural Parents

A child born to an unmarried mother may not have the father's name entered on
the birth certificate unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgement of
paternity. If the acknowledgement of paternity 1s signed and received before
the certificate 1s registered, the father's name and other related Information
may be entered 1n the appropriate Items on the original certificate. The
acknowledgement of paternity 1s transmitted with the original certificate to
the State Registrar, where 1t 1s retained as documentary evidence.
An acknowledgement of paternity received after the certificate 1s registered
1s not acceptable for registration. Alternatively, the father's information
M y be added by amendment as specified 1n Rule 3.2. However, 1f another man
1s shown as the father of the child on the original certificate, the
correction can only be made following a judicial determination of paternity or
following adoption.
RULE 4

Oelayed Registration of Birth (Section 26-2-8)

Rule 4.1

Registration - Ten Oays to One Year

Certificates of birth filed after ten days, but within one year from the date
of birth, shall be registered on the standard birth certificate 1n the manner
prescribed in Section 26-2-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
Such
certificate shall not be marked •Delayed.11
- 5 -
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Utah State Department of Health

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY
BY PARENTS

We

and

Fether of Child

Mother of Child

hereby acknowledge that

is the natural father
(name of father)

.child born

of the
Sex of Child

Birthplace

Birthdate

Hospttel (or eddress)

to

City

County

Of
Meiden name of mother

Mother's usual residence

It is our desire that the father's information become a part of the birth certificate qf our child.
Name of Child

First

Middle

Last

First

Middle

List

Yame of Father
\ge of Father at time of this child's birth

Father's Birthdate.
Race of rather

birthplace of Father
Signature (Mother)

Address

I hereby acknowledge paternity of the child identified above. This is to signify my willingness and intent to support this child to the best of my ability.
Address

lignature (Father)
ubscnbed and sworn to before me this

(SEAL)

day of

,19

% gnew re

Notary Public

Address

My Commission Expires
>DH.BHS-46
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

T.>:-,o««y M. Shna

Clerk of the Court
Olan Court of Appeal

ORDER DENYING
SUMMARY REVERSAL
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Steven H. Swayne,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Court of Appeals No. 880177-CA

v.
L.D.S. Social Services, John Doe
and Jane Doe,
Defendants and Respondents.

Appellant's motion for summary reversal of the trial court's
judgment is hereby denied.
Appellant's motion for injunction pending appeal is hereby
scheduled for hearing on Monday, April 18, 1988 at the hour of 1:30
p.m.
Dated this

/g

day of April, 1988.

BY THE COURT

-<Z^&f*"****» <5^Q**v^*><NORMAN H.JACKSON, Judge

APP14198P!
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF /^PPEALS

CienfTSTtf^T CCHSt

OOOOO

Steven H. Swayne,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
ORDER

v.

Case No. 880177-CA

L.D.S. Social Services, et al.
Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Greenwood (On Law and Motion).
Appellant's motion for injunction pending appeal is hereby
denied.
The Court further determines that the best interests of the
minor child and of the parties require that this appeal be
scheduled for expedited briefing and hearing.

Therefore,

pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 2, the Court orders as follows:
1. Appellant's brief shall be filed with this Court and
served on or before May 10, 1988;
2. Respondent's brief shall be filed with this Court and
served on or before June 9, 1988;
3. Appellant's reply brief shall be filed with this Court
on or before June 16, 1988;
4. All designated portions of the record on appeal shall
be filed with this Court on or before June 10, 1988; and
5. Hearing on oral argument shall be held on Tuesday, June
21, 1988, at 2:00 p.m., before a regularly scheduled panel
of this Court.
DATED this 20th day of April, 1988.
FOR THE COURT:

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without du
process of law.
tec. 11. [Courts open—ftodrtss of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and eTery person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be.administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
Sec. 3 1 [Uniform operation of laws]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

76-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims.
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments,
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it
shall appear that the parent or parents whose, consent would otherwise be
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control,
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive patents for said child, and such
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption.
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55,
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon
such parent's attaining the age of majority.
(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the department and in the office of the county clerk in every county in thi6 state.
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall include his name and address, the name and last known address of the
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose.
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required.
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health,
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fathers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question.

78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his
family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimatefromthe time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not
apply to such an adoption.

